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Bridging the Gap
Canadian Engineer Operations at Canal du 
Nord–Bourlon Wood, 1918 
B R I A N  P A S C A S
Abstract : During the last hundred days of the Great War, the Allied armies 
swept eastward past the Hindenburg Line with hammer-blow offensive 
warfare. Performing their work under intense machine gun and shell fire, 
engineers erected bridges and constructed roads, allowing infantry and 
artillery units to pursue the retreating enemy. These combat engineers 
played a vital role in battle tactics and logistical services of open warfare. 
Their versatile formations contributed to the Canadian Corps’ rapid 
victories, which included the successful Canal du Nord crossing leading 
to the capture of Bourlon Wood in September 1918.
The battle of Bourlon Wood was an engineers’ battle. The success of the 
whole operation depended on the speed with which the necessary crossings 
of the Canal du Nord were provided, and the way they were maintained 
and improved during the day, so as to enable the guns and infantry to be 
maintained in the positions which they had reached in their advance.1
Was the Battle of Canal du nord—also referred to as Bourlon Wood (BW) in official documents—an engineers’ 
battle? Most battle narratives concentrate on infantry and artillery 
tactics; some analyse the war’s operational and strategic levels. 
1  J.F.B. Livesay, “Canadian Engineers’ Marvellous Feats at Canal du Nord Scrap,” 
The Montreal Daily Star, 5 November 1918, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29, 
File 5, Library and Archives Canada [hereafter LAC]. See also J. Castell Hopkins, 
Canada at War: A Record of Heroism and Achievement 1914-1918 (Toronto: The 
Canadian Annual Review, 1919), 192. Lloyd George declared: “This is an engineers’ 
war, … we need arms more than men….” See William Philpott, Attrition: Fighting the 
First World War (London: Little, Brown, 2014), 166.
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2 Bridging the Gap
Ancillary services receive less recognition. To refute or confirm this 
“engineers’ battle” assertion, one must understand the Canadian 
engineers’ logistical battlefield work in the last one hundred days of 
the Great War. 
“Engineers were considered, first and foremost, as fighting 
troops. Each one went through the normal course of infantry 
training and were individually armed and equipped as such.”2 The 
military engineer (the sapper) frequently came under enemy fire while 
performing engineer services in the front line. The sapper operated as 
both soldier and technician.3 
The Great War engineer’s numerous duties included constructing 
and repairing roads, assembling portable and permanent bridges, 
tunnelling and mining, laying tramway tracks, establishing water 
points, and disarming booby traps. This article examines the 
Canadian engineer’s role in the last months of the war, beginning 
with the engineer battalions created in the spring of 1918 from field 
companies and pioneer battalions. In September, these new battalions 
faced an immense challenge constructing crossings and bridges while 
under enemy shell and machine gun fire. Infantry, tank, artillery, and 
tramways units depended on the engineers for unobstructed passage 
across mine-cratered roads and the Canal du Nord, littered with 
destroyed bridges, near Bourlon Wood. The engineering work, with a 
focus on bridge building, is assessed during the opening day’s assault 
at the Canal du Nord on 27 September. 
The military engineer’s mission in the Great War was 
straightforward:
The purpose of engineers is to apply engineering science to the 
emergencies of modern warfare, in order to protect and assist the 
troops[,] to ameliorate the conditions under which they are serving and 
to facilitate locomotion and communication.4 
2  David Love, A Nation In Making Volume 2: The Organization and Administration 
of the Canadian Military During the First World War (Ottawa, Service Publications, 
2012), 271.
3  Bill Rawling, Technicians of Battle: Canadian Field Engineering From Pre-
Confederation To The Post-Cold War Era (Toronto: Military Engineering Institute 
of Canada, 2001), xiii. 
4  James L. Melville, “The Canadian Engineers,” Canada in the Great World War 
(Toronto: United Publishers of Canada, 1921), 38.
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reorganisation
All divisional engineers were pooled under the direct executive 
command of the Canadian Corps’ Chief Engineer who became the 
General Officer Commanding (GOC) Canadian engineers.5 Under 
Army orders, British Royal Engineer (RE) field companies and 
pioneer battalions were attached under the Canadian Corps’ Chief 
Engineer when the work required additional units.6 The GOC was also 
responsible for training, promotions, transfers, and postings. Thirty-
eight-year-old Brig.-Gen. W. Bethune Lindsay became the Canadian 
Corps’ Chief Engineer in March 1916. His promotion to major general 
in December 1919 was retroactive to 1 August 1918. Lindsay was 
technical adviser to Canadian Corps commander Lieut.-Gen. Sir 
Arthur Currie for all engineer services. The four infantry divisions 
each retained a pioneer battalion and three field companies. Three 
tunnelling companies were categorised as army troops and the corps 
troops included entrenching battalions and four labour battalions.7 
In November 1917, Lindsay proposed engineer units with 
integral labour—merging skilled and unskilled men—thereby freeing 
the infantry from manual labour tasks. Before the reorganisation, 
Canadian engineers planned and supervised daily infantry working 
parties. This led to the motto: “engineers responsible for quality and 
infantry for quantity.”8 The infantry despised these working parties, 
especially the digging, and did as little as possible. The engineer 
who arrived late and forgot the tools intensified the loathing. “[U]
nder these conditions the average man does not do 25% of the work 
he might fairly be expected to accomplish.”9 Currie remarked that 
the infantry would fight a battle one day and perform engineering 
5  Halfdan F.H. Hertzberg, “The Re-organization of the Engineering Troops of a 
Canadian Division-Great War 1914-18,” Canadian Defence Quarterly (July 1924): 
46.
6  Love, A Nation In Making Volume 2, 275.
7  The four entrenching battalions were disbanded in August 1917 and replaced by 
the Canadian Corps Reinforcement Camp. Two of the four labour battalions became 
railway troop battalions and the other two became the 1st and 2nd Infantry Works 
battalions. In mid-September, these Works battalions were disbanded to create four 
infantry works companies under the authority of the Canadian Labour Group. 
8  Hertzberg, “Re-organization of the Engineering Troops,” 41.
9  Secret Memorandum on Engineer Services, MG30, E100, Volume 37, File 166, 
LAC.
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work the next.10 A reorganisation was needed to supervise and carry 
out all the engineering work itself.11 Currie realised the engineer 
and machine gun units were drawing heavily on the infantry for 
additional personnel and he had to stop the drain on the infantry. He 
recommended expanding each engineer field company to an engineer 
battalion, lumping in the pioneer battalion.12 On 27 February 1918, 
Currie wrote: “…I consider this reorganization to be so necessary that I 
would prefer to go without Infantry rather than without Engineers.”13 
The War Office granted authority for the changes on 24 March. On 
24 May, Currie ordered the engineering reorganisation, which was 
finalized in late July.14 In the meantime, personnel, animals, vehicles, 
and inventory stores were transferred to the new battalions.
Under the reorganisation, the engineer divisional headquarters, 
field companies, pioneer battalions, base reinforcements, 5th Canadian 
Division Engineers’ field companies, and two tunnelling companies 
were regrouped into engineer brigades. The four infantry divisions 
were each allotted a brigade. A headquarters, three battalions, 
and a seventy-member pontoon bridging transport unit (PBTU) 
defined the engineer brigade staffed by 3,249 officers and other ranks 
(OR). A field company became an engineer battalion comprising a 
headquarters and four companies, with twenty-four 3-ton lorries and 
over 500 horses. On 4 June, the 2nd Brigade’s three battalions were 
the last of the twelve new battalions to be established.
These four brigades reported to the Chief Engineer who 
maintained a staff including field engineers for tramways, bridges, 
and roads. In the war’s last months, the corps area was divided into 
four parts with an engineer brigade made responsible for each part. 
The same engineers remained on the same job until its completion 
ensuring continuity.15 Corps troops, signals service, detached units, 
and the CE Motor Transport Company also reported to the Chief 
Engineer. Five army troops companies, two tramways companies, 
10  A.M.J. Hyatt, General Sir Arthur Currie: A Military Biography (Toronto: 
University of Toronto, 1987), 111.
11  Hertzberg, “Re-organization of the Engineering Troops,” 40. 
12  Arthur Currie to Mr. McGillicuddy, MG30, E100, Volume 27, File 7, LAC.             
13  A. Kerry and William McDill, The History of the Corps of Royal Canadian 
Engineers, Volume 1 1749-1939 (Ottawa: The Military Association of Canada, 
1962), 162.
14  Melville, “Canadian Engineers,” 69.
15  Hertzberg, “Re-organization of the Engineering Troops,” 46.
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the Canadian Corps Survey Section and one “artizan” company 
were amalgamated as corps troops. Detached units included the No. 
3 Tunnelling Company and an anti-aircraft searchlight company. 
The Canadian Engineers Reinforcement Depot (CERD) retained 
fifty officers and 1,600 OR.16 The battalion ranks were augmented 
throughout 1918. In September, the 8th Battalion, CE received 144 
reinforcements from the CERD; 31 percent were draftees.17
Currie wrote “that much of the success of the Canadian Corps 
in the final 100 days was due to the fact that they had sufficient 
engineers to do the engineering work and that in those closing battles 
we did not employ the infantry in that kind of work.”18 However, the 
poor bloody infantry could not escape the pick and shovel burden. 
On the evening of 29 August 1918, 100 OR from the 2nd Battalion, 
CE were ordered to consolidate newly captured enemy territory. The 
men, transporting 500 picks and 500 shovels, finally arrived at 3 a.m. 
With sufficient infantry to do the work, the sappers were dismissed 
from the overcrowded outpost line. The infantry dug themselves in 
and secured the line.19
Currie noted after the war that a British expert “committee 
found that the Canadian infantry organization and the Canadian 
Engineer organization and the Canadian Machine Gun organization 
was the most effective possible and therefore should be adopted for 
the British.”20 
canal du nord – bourlon wood operation
On 15 September 1918, Field Marshal Sir Douglas Haig held a strategic 
conference with the First, Third, and Fourth Army commanders. He 
ordered a joint operation towards Cambrai by General Sir Henry 
Horne’s First Army and General Sir Julian Byng’s Third Army with 
the capture of Bourlon Wood by First Army. On 23 September, 
16  Administration of Engineer Services Canadian Army Corps, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 
4811, LAC; Canadian Engineers Reorganization, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4811, LAC.
17  Patrick Dennis, Reluctant Warriors: Canadian Conscripts and the Great War 
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2017), 263.
18  Currie to Mr. McGillicuddy, MG30, E100, Volume 27, File 7, LAC.
19  Appendix H, Report by 1st Brigade, CE, Drocourt-Quéant Operations, MG30, 
E100, Folder 37, File 168, LAC.
20  Currie to Mr. McGillicuddy, MG30, E100, Volume 27, File 7, LAC.
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Allied generalissimo Marshal Foch sanctioned four sequential 
hammer-blow offensives from the River Meuse to the North Sea: a 
Franco-American attack on 26 September in the Meuse-Argonne, the 
British First and Third Armies attack on 27 September, a Flanders 
Group (British Second Army, Belgian, and French) attack on 28 
September between the sea and the River Lys, and a British Fourth 
Army and French First Army attack on 29 September at the Canal 
de St. Quentin.21 The Canadian Corps attached to the First Army 
had to protect the Third Army’s left flank during their advance. 
After Currie submitted his plans to General Horne, First Army 
issued instructions on 18 September to the Canadian Corps and 
Lieut.-Gen. Alexander Godley’s British XXII Corps. 
The Canadian Corps with the 11th British Division and 7th 
Tank Battalion under its command planned an ambitious two-phase 
operation. The corps’ first phase objective: capturing Bourlon Wood 
(about 2 miles east of the Canal du Nord) and the high ground about 
Pilgrim’s Rest (north of Bourlon Wood), La Maison Neuve (north of 
Pilgrim’s Rest) with the left flank thrown back across the plateau via 
Sauchicourt Farm to the canal, and the Fontaine-Notre-Dame Line 
east of Bourlon Wood. The Canadians had to capture three strongly 
wired trench systems after crossing the Canal du Nord: the partially-
dug Canal du Nord Line (200-500 yards east of the canal) with its 
two wired trench lines and deep dugouts, the Marquion Line (a mile 
farther east), and the Marcoing Line defending Bourlon village and 
Bourlon Wood. Numerous fortified shell holes, concealed dugouts, 
sunken roads, and pits populated the area between the canal and the 
enemy’s first defence line. The second phase entailed seizing bridges 
over the Canal de l’Escaut northeast of Cambrai, establishing the 
necessary bridgeheads, and capturing the high ground overlooking 
the Sensée Valley between the Canal de l’Escaut and the Canal du 
Nord. 
Previously, the Canadian Corps had received orders to attack the 
Drocourt-Quéant Line on 2 September and exploit rapidly forwards, 
seizing crossings over the Canal du Nord on a 5-mile front from Sains-
Lez-Marquion to Palluel. The 7th Battalion, CE with the 4th and 5th 
Army Troops Companies, CE prepared materiel for heavy bridges 
at Sains-Lez-Marquion, Marquion, and 2,700 yards further north at 
21  Ferdinand Foch, The Memoirs of Marshal Foch (London: Heinemann, 1931), 473-
74.
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Sauchy-Cauchy.22 The 3rd Battalion, CE would be responsible for light 
transport bridges and cork raft infantry footbridges over the canal 
and the River Agache, for crossings selected on 31 August.23 However, 
the canal crossings were not captured on 2 September, forcing the 
postponement of the bridging operations. This delay would turn out 
to be a godsend.
Two days later, Currie personally reconnoitred the Canal du Nord 
after the Germans had retreated east of the canal destroying bridges 
and roads as they withdrew. He concluded a frontal attack on the 
German positions east of the canal would be formidable stating:
1. The canal itself is a serious obstacle,
2. The marshes on the eastern side made difficult going, 
3. It is strongly defended by machine guns from the trench system 
running parallel to the canal, 
4. The high ground on the east gives a perfect command of the 
approaches, 
5. The more we advance to the eastward the more violent becomes the 
enfilade fire.24
The Canal du Nord was indeed a daunting hurdle. It had been under 
construction until the outbreak of war and not all was excavated and 
water-filled. The canal was dry, except for shallow pools, for nearly 
7.5 miles from Hermies in the south to 500 yards northeast of Inchy-
en-Artois at Lock 3.25 The ground rose from north to south along 
the canal’s course from Arleux to Noyon connecting the Canal de la 
22  Gerald W.L. Nicholson, Canadian Expeditionary Force 1914-1919 (Ottawa: 
Queen’s Printer, 1964), 433-34; War Diary [hereafter WD], 3rd Brigade, CE, 
September 1918, Engineer Instructions No. C.3, 2 September 1918, LAC.
23  WD, 3rd Battalion, CE, September 1918, Operation Order No. 108, LAC; 
Appendix H, Report by 1st Brigade, CE, MG30, E100, Volume 37, File 168, LAC.
24  Hugh Urquhart, Arthur Currie: The Biography of a Great Canadian (Toronto: 
J.M. Dent & Sons, 1950), 249; Mark Humphries, (ed.), The Selected Papers of Sir 
Arthur Currie: Diaries, Letters, and Report to the Ministry, 1917-1933 (Waterloo: 
LCMSDS Press of Wilfred Laurier University, 2008), 116.
25  After the war, legions of rats from the canal infested Sains-Lez-Marquion and 
Inchy-en-Artois. 
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Sensée with the Canal de la Somme and sloped upwards from the 
Canal du Nord towards Quarry Wood and Bourlon Wood in the east. 
The canal, between 20 and 40 yards wide, narrowed to about 12 yards 
near Marquion. Towpaths, roughly 12 to 15-foot-wide, bordered it. 
From Lock 3 to the Bapaume-Cambrai Road south of Moeuvres, 
the dry canal bed was either level with the surrounding terrain or 
partially excavated several feet below ground level. Narrow-gauge 
tracks ran down the centre between Locks 3 and 4. Banks rising 
above ground level from the chalky excavation spoil lined the canal—
similar to an aqueduct. From Moeuvres to Inchy-en-Artois, the banks’ 
height varied up to 20 feet. In some areas the unfinished eastern bank 
was considerably lower than the western bank. These banks were 
either sloped or sheer and were pockmarked with burrowed cuttings 
for road and track passages. North of Inchy-en-Artois, the canal’s 
interior banks were revetted with 4 feet of brick.26 At Sains-Lez-
Marquion, the canal bed was 16 feet below the towpath. 
At the Arras-Cambrai Road (see appendix A: map grid reference 
W.9.d.2.4), stagnant spring water filled the canal. Farther south 
(W.21.a.0.6)—about 500 yards north of Sains-Lez-Marquion—the 
terrain on each side of the peaty canal became marshy in wet weather, 
further widening the logistical and tactical obstacle. Numerous water-
filled drainage ditches paralleled the canal on both sides. North of 
Lock 3 (W.26.c.9.4) to Palluel, the canal contained, on average, 8 
feet of water. The River Agache, a sluggish swampy stream lined 
with willows, ran parallel to the canal, about 300-500 yards east of 
it above Lock 3 and west of the canal below the lock beside Paviland 
Wood to Inchy-en-Artois.27 North of Sauchy-Cauchy, it crossed again 
to the west side of the canal. The river varied in width from 6 to 15 
feet. Near Sains-Lez-Marquion, the 9-foot-wide Agache ran 9 to 12 
feet deep.28 
In mid-September, Currie—whose corps overlooked the marsh 
and the water-filled canal from Sauchy Cauchy to Sains-Lez-
Marquion—advocated side-stepping 3,000 yards south to avoid this 
26  WD, 1st Infantry Brigade, September 1918, Appendix 17, LAC.
27  W. Hastings Anderson, “The Crossing of the Canal du Nord by the First Army, 
27th September, 1918,” Canadian Defence Quarterly 2, 1 (October 1924): 65; Michel 
Gravel, Tough As Nails (Ottawa: CEF Books, 2006), 70. 
28  Intelligence File, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3912, Folder 42, File 5, LAC.
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serious obstacle.29 On 20 September, the 2nd Canadian Division 
shifted south to Moeuvres’ northern edge, taking over a section from 
the Third Army’s XVII Corps’ front line held by the 52nd British 
Division. The British XXII Corps moved south occupying the old 
Canadian front to 1,200 yards north of the Arras-Cambrai Road. 
The Third Army now held a 10,500-yard dry canal stretch and the 
First Army held 2,600 yards.30 
The Canadian Corps’ new battle front ran 6,400 yards along 
the canal’s western bank, varying 50 to 500 yards back from it.31 
From its southern (E.14 central) to northern boundary (W.4.c.2.7), 
the frontage encompassed the northern outskirts of Moeuvres (1,500 
yards north of the Bapaume-Cambrai Road), Lock 4, Inchy-en-
Artois, Lock 3, and Sains-Lez-Marquion. It ended 1,200 yards north 
of the Arras-Cambrai Road. The Hindenburg Support Line crossed 
the Canal du Nord opposite Moeuvres at E.21.a.1.7. The XXII Corps 
took over control as far south as the Arras-Cambrai Road on 25 
September.32 During the night of 25-26 September, the 1st and 4th 
Canadian Divisions and the 11th and 56th British Divisions relieved 
the 2nd Canadian Division at the canal.
“[T]he Canal du Nord was impassable on the northern 3,800 
yards. The Corps had, therefore, to cross the Canal du Nord on a 
front of 2,600 yards, and to expand later fanwise in a north-easterly 
direction to a front exceeding 15,000 yards.”33 The corps would launch 
its attack on Friday, 27 September at this constricted bottleneck from 
the jumping-off line, ranging 300 to 750 yards from the canal. Only 
a small portion of the artillery could be sited forwards in the narrow 
gateway. Unlike the straightforward frontal attack at Amiens, Canal 
du Nord incorporated “risk and manoeuver.”34 Upon returning from 
29  Arthur Currie to Frank Underhill, 17 September 1920, MG30, E100, Volume 27, 
File 7, LAC.
30  James Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume IV 8th 
August- 26th September (London: The Imperial War Museum, Nashville: the Battery 
Press, 1993), 426.
31  Lieut.-Gen. Sir Archibald Macdonell, “The Old Red Patch,” Canadian Defence 
Quarterly IX, 1 (October 1931): 13.
32  WD, Canadian Corps General Staff, Volume 37, September 1918, RG9, III-D-2, 
Volume 4789, Folder 3, LAC.
33  Arthur Currie, Canadian Corps Operations During the Year 1918: Interim Report 
(Ottawa: Department of Militia and Defence, 1919), 57.
34  Shane Schreiber, Shock Army of the British Army: The Canadian Corps in the 
Last 100 Days of the Great War (St. Catharines, ON: Vanwell, 2004), 110.
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Canadian Corps headquarters after examining Currie’s complicated 
operational plans, the deeply disturbed Horne declared three times: 
“I don’t believe I ought to let them do it.” Horne’s senior staff officer 
Maj.-Gen. Hastings Anderson replied: “If Currie says they can do it, 
… they will.”35 
The corps’ first phase—a two-division assault on the dry 2,600-
yard frontage—entailed three intermediate objectives marked on 
maps as the Red, Green, and Blue Lines. The Red Line formed 
an arc north of Sains-Lez-Marquion, curving southeast along the 
Marquion Line. The Green Line included Marquion (400 yards east 
of the canal and intersected by the Arras-Cambrai Road), Quarry 
Wood (across from Inchy-en-Artois), a portion of Bourlon village, and 
Bourlon Wood’s western border. The Blue Line stretched from south 
of Sauchy-Lestrée, southeast to Pilgrim’s Rest, extending to the light 
railway junction east of Bourlon Wood, and ending at the corps’ 
southern boundary at Fontaine-Notre-Dame. The advance to the 
Blue Line was arranged as a set-piece infantry and artillery operation 
under a creeping shrapnel, high explosive, and smoke barrage with 
pauses at the Red and Green Lines. The 1st Canadian Division—on 
the left with a 1,100-yard restricted frontage—would swing left in a 
fanlike action and capture Sains-Lez-Marquion and Marquion. The 
4th Canadian Division—on the right with a 1,500-yard frontage—
planned to capture Bourlon village and Bourlon Wood. They faced 
three German divisions (7th Cavalry, 12th, and 187th) between 
Inchy-en-Artois and the Canal de la Sensée (12,000 yards distance) 
plus five more in reserve.36 
The Brown Line designated the second phase’s single objective 
on a 10,000 yard four-division front. From south to north, the 3rd, 
4th, and 1st Canadian Divisions and the 11th British Division were to 
advance to the Brown Line. The 169th Brigade, 56th British Division, 
XXII Corps was left of the 11th British Division. The 3rd Canadian 
Division and the 11th British Division movements needed traffic 
control to avoid undue congestion.37 The second phase’s fulfillment 
relied on the engineers for artillery and light railways passages. “The 
35  Wilfred Bovey, “General Sir Arthur Currie: An Appreciation,” Canadian Defence 
Quarterly XI, 2 (January 1934): 148-49.
36  Anderson, “Crossing of the Canal du Nord”: 65; MG30, E5, Volume 3, Battle BW 
Intelligence Summaries Folder, LAC.
37  Canadian Corps Bourlon Wood Instructions No. 1, 23 September 1918, RG9, 
III-C-1, Volume 3856, Folder 76, File 6, LAC. 
11
Pascas: Bridging the Gap
Published by Scholars Commons @ Laurier, 2019
12 Bridging the Gap
success of the whole operations beyond the BLUE Line depends on 
the speed with which the CANAL is bridged, and, therefore, all units 
must be prepared to give the Engineers every possible facility and 
assistance to enable them to complete the bridges quickly.”38 Each 
phase included the Yellow Line (a line of exploitation) 1,200 yards 
beyond the Blue and Brown Lines. Patrols were to be established, 
enemy battery positions captured, and the frontage extended farther.39 
In total, 1,347 guns and howitzers—804 from the Canadian Corps 
and 543 from the XXII Corps—supported the attack.40  
From Moeuvres, northwards, the enemy still occupied trench lines 
east of the canal and outposts on the western side.41 Immense numbers 
of machine guns populated the canal borders, with batteries and anti-
tank guns ready to sweep the approaches. During their retreat on 2 
September, the enemy had blown up the metal and wooden bridges 
(some by aerial bombardment), heaved girders into the canal, and 
smashed abutments. Moreover, the Germans had mined and shelled 
the main roads, leaving them pitted with huge craters. Bridges 
constructed adjacent to the destroyed bridges would avoid time-
consuming detours from the roads leading to the mangled bridges.
Under enemy barrages and gun fire, the engineers intended 
to provide sufficient roads, bridges, and tramways for guns, 
ammunition, stores, and rations for the assaulting troops. The goal 
was to transport guns at Zero Hour plus four hours over the southern 
crossings. The bridging operations were divided into three phases: 
infantry footbridges, crossings for first-line transport (field guns, 
general service wagons, and horse transport), and heavy bridges for 
lorries and 17-ton 6-inch howitzers.42 
There were three main military bridge classes. Light bridges were 
intended for temporary use and meant for the passage of men in small 
numbers. Medium pontoon and trestle bridges could carry men four 
abreast, horses, and field artillery; a 90-foot-span bridge could be 
38  1st Canadian Division, B-W Instructions No. 3, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3856, 
Folder 77, File 1, LAC.
39  Map “A”, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 76, File 6, LAC.
40  Anderson, “Crossing of the Canal du Nord”: 67.
41  On 16 September, the post opposite Sauchy-Cauchy was captured by the Germans 
resulting in eighteen missing 5th CMR men. See WD, 8th Brigade, September 1918, 
LAC; Charles Henry Savage Memoir 1936, CLIP, https://www.canadianletters.ca.
42  Interim Report on Crossings of Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 
29, File 4, LAC; Administration of Engineer Services Canadian Army Corps, RG9, 
III-D-2, Volume 4811, LAC.
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erected in sixty to ninety minutes under adverse conditions.43 Heavy 
bridges were designed to carry all army vehicles. These metal bridges 
required twelve to twenty-four hours’ work to erect. The bridge types 
included cork pier (cork bales inside wooden crates), pontoon, heavy 
pontoon, trestle, and heavy steel. Some bridges combined pontoons 
and trestles.44
The Inglis portable military bridge—light for infantry or heavy 
for all arms—was made with welded steel tubes. Each light bridge 
bay measured 8 feet long, 8 feet high, and 8 feet wide. A heavy bridge 
bay measured 12 feet long, 12 feet high, and 12 feet wide.45 The 
sappers used the first bay, constructed on a 2-wheeled trolley, to push 
the completed bridge to the other bank. A fifteen-bay bridge required 
forty-six wagons to transport the materiel. Both triangular (4-legged 
pyramid) and rectangular Inglis bridges were available.46 Captain 
James Melville requested two Inglis rectangular heavy bridges for the 
canal and trained 200 engineers in their operation by assembling and 
disassembling a 216-foot-span bridge a few days before Zero Hour.47 
“The Engineer preparations for the BOURLON WOOD 
operations were undertaken on five day’s [sic] notice…”48 All the 
corps’ resources in engineer units along with the field companies and 
pioneer battalions from the 11th British Division were at Lindsay’s 
disposal. Before Zero Hour, these resources had repaired shell-
destroyed roads, built cross-country tracks for infantry and horse 
transport, extended light tramways to the jumping-off line, carved 
out dugout accommodations, and provided water for men and horses. 
This pooled resource repaired 18 miles of roads (excluding artillery 
tracks) up to the front line and constructed 7 miles of tramways, on 
43  Notes on Bridging Operations, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4808, File 185, LAC.
44  Summary of Operations, 1918, Canadian Engineers, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, 
Folder 30, File 14, LAC.
45  The Mark IV tank’s width with machine gun sponsons was over 13 feet. The Mark 
V tank required a 14 feet, 6 inches roadway clearance. See Melville, “The Canadian 
Engineers,” 43.
46  RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4384, Folder 2, Files 1 and 3, LAC; Inglis portable bridge, 
RG24-C-6-K, Volume 22002, LAC. 
47  John Gardam, Seventy Years After 1914-1918 (Stittsville, ON: Canada’s Wings, 
Inc, 1983), 39; Chief Engineer, September 1918, Heavy Bridging Operations, 
Appendix B, LAC.
48  Untitled three-page report, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29, File 4, LAC.
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which petrol-driven tractors delivered over 3,000 tons of ammunition 
per day.49 
Initially, nine main crossings over the Canal du Nord were 
devised. These crossings, from the corps’ southern boundary frontage 
situated north of Moeuvres to the northern boundary above the Arras-
Cambrai Road, were designated “A” through “H” and “K”. “A”, “B”, 
“C”, and “D” were on the dry canal bed. “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”, and 
“K” were over water necessitating pontoon, trestle, and steel-tube 
bridges, some adjacent to destroyed bridges. Upon capturing the Blue 
Line (3,000-7,000 yards east of the canal), the materiel for the heavy 
bridges at “F”, “G”, and “K” would be brought up. Until then, all 
heavy traffic would use “C” and “D”.50 
Bourlon Wood Engineer Instructions No. 1 dealt with the 
locations for the construction and repair of the dry crossings, bridges, 
tramways, and roads at Canal du Nord. Engineer units were assigned 
to each of these services: all four engineer brigades, all five army 
troops companies, both tramways companies, the four PBTUs, and 
three field companies along with one pioneer battalion from the 11th 
British Division. The 4th and 5th Army Troops Companies were 
responsible for erecting two Inglis steel bridges at “F” and “K” on 
old abutments. The 10th and 11th Battalions in the 4th Brigade, CE 
were assigned “A”, “B”, and “C”. Four infantry footbridges and “D”, 
“E”, “F”, and “G” were assigned to the 1st Brigade, CE. The Royal 
Engineers were responsible for “H” and “K” and three footbridges.51 
In the second phase, the 7th Battalion, CE would construct all 
temporary bridging over the Canal de l’Escaut. Engineer brigade 
detachments would assist the field artillery brigades with moving 
the guns to their new positions. Sappers would reconnoitre for booby 
traps and mines and repair dugouts for headquarters. In preparing 
for Zero Hour, sapper parties had erected and dismantled model 
bridges in the fields.52
49  Ibid.
50  James Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume V 26th 
September-11th November 1918, Appendix V (London: The Imperial War Museum, 
Nashville: the Battery Press, 1993), 633.
51  Bourlon Wood Engineer Instructions No. 1, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29, 
File 6, LAC; For heavy bridging details, see Bourlon Wood Engineer Instructions No. 
3, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4426, Folder 3, File 9, LAC.
52  Narrative Operations of 2nd CDA, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3912, Folder 42, File 8, 
LAC.
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Infantry from the 3rd and 4th Canadian Divisions were to cross 
at “A” and “B” and the 1st Canadian Division and the 11th British 
Division at “C” and “D”. Once the bridges at “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”, 
and “K” were erected, traffic would be dispersed as follows: the 3rd 
Canadian Division “A” and “B”, the 4th Canadian Division “C” and 
“D”, and the 1st Canadian Division “E” and “F”. The 11th British 
Division’s 32nd and 34th brigades located to the right of the 56th 
British Division’s 169th Brigade were assigned the “G”, “H”, and “K” 
bridges.53 The three British brigades would cross the canal between 
five-an-a-half and six-an-a-half hours after Zero Hour as far south as 
W.15, south of Marquion.54 The “G”, “H”, and “K” bridges were still 
under construction at this time. Therefore, the brigades were likely 
forced to use the British-constructed footbridges erected between “G” 
and “H” bridges and any salvageable German footbridges. Supply 
dumps were completed and lorries with bridging materiel weighing 
145 tons were ready to move during the evening of the 26th. 
Bourlon Wood Engineer Instruction No. 3 dealt with water supply 
work allotment for brigade and army troops.55 Open warfare conditions 
required access to water supplies and ”facilities to provide for the 
existence of what is practically a ‘moving city’ with a population 
varying from 105,000 to 160,000 men and from 25,000 to 60,000 
horses…”56 In September, the four engineer brigades organised forward 
water supply sections. They searched for water sources in captured 
areas, collected water samples for testing and marked wells, eventually 
using pumping sets, water tank lorries, and sterilising lorries.57
In the early morning of 27 September, the Canadian Corps with 
the First Army and the Third Army formed a 13-mile front facing 
Cambrai. German flares illuminated the industrialised battlefield. As 
Zero Hour approached (5:20 a.m., dark and misty, forty minutes before 
dawn), the 1st and 4th Canadian Division shock troops were deployed 
along the Moeuvres-Lock 3 jumping-off line. The nearby assembly 
53  B.W. Instructions No. 2, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3913, Folder 34, File 5, LAC.
54  Addendum No. 1 to 11th Division Order 218, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3856, Folder 
77, File 8, LAC; 56th Division Order No. 206, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3856, Folder 
77, File 10, LAC.
55  Bourlon Wood Engineer Instructions No. 3, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 
29, File 6, LAC.
56  Administration of Engineer Services Canadian Army Corps, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 
4811, LAC.
57  Summary Canadian Corps Water Supply, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4808, File 185, 
LAC.
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areas were congested with artillery guns and limbers, ammunition 
lorries and stockpiled shells, machine gun batteries, ambulances, and 
transport for bridging materiel. The leading battalions spearheaded 
the rush across the canal the instant the thunderous bombardment 
erupted in a line of flashes. Bursting shell infernos, acrid cordite 
fumes, and the ear-piercing uproar assaulted their senses. Explosions 
reverberated between the banks. As dawn broke, a river of khaki 
advanced behind the rapid-fire 18-pounder barrage, which had 
pulverised the west bank and canal before creeping forwards 100 yards 
every four minutes towards the Red Line.58 The 4.5-inch howitzers 
and trench mortars swept the ground beyond the 18-pounder barrage. 
Smoke drums and burning oil drums were projected across the canal, 
competing with incoming gas shell salvos. Field guns, Lewis guns, and 
rifle grenades silenced German machine gun posts, trench mortars, 
and rifle pits near the canal.59 Although 60-pounders and howitzers of 
the Canadian heavy artillery’s counter battery came into action, the 
enemy had shortened the range and retaliation shelling targeted the 
troops as they emerged from the canal stumbling through broke belts 
of tangled wire. Private Stan Colbeck recalled: “a shell exploded right 
behind us. … The screams behind us I will never forget.”60
A 187th German infantry regiment officer witnessed the attack: 
It was still dark, when suddenly at 5:15 in the morning a heavy barrage 
of fire rained down on the regiment’s positions. The fire was correct on 
the canal. Already after 15 minutes the English attacked the canal out 
of the woodlands in large masses. They were struck back. Two tanks 
that tried to enter the canal area at a place where a small rail road cut 
through the thick canal bank were destroyed by combined charge.61
The constricted 2,600-yard corridor south of Lock 3 permitted only 
four Canadian battalions to attack simultaneously in the first wave 
58  The creeping barrage’s rate of advance was not identical for the 1st and 4th 
Divisional zones.
59  Robert C. Fetherstonhaugh, The Royal Montreal Regiment 14th Battalion, CEF 
1914-1925 (Montreal: The Royal Montreal Regiment, 1927), 250.
60  James L. McWilliams and R. James Steel, The Suicide Battalion (St. Catharines, 
ON: Vanwell, 1990), 175. Colbeck was wounded the next day.
61  Gerhard F. Dose, “The 187th Infantry Regiment in Flanders, at Arras and 
Cambrai 1917/18,” http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/dose/11-Flandern-04.htm 
(accessed 3 June 2018).
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at 5:20 a.m. These leading under-strength units, south to north, 
were the 4th Division’s 44th and 46th Battalions and the 1st 
Division’s 4th and 14th Battalions. The 44th crossed the canal north 
of Moeuvre, the 46th east of Inchy-en-Artois, the 4th to the left of 
the 46th and the 14th south of Lock 3, 800 yards southwest of Sains-
Lez-Marquion. All four battalions slid down and scrambled across 
the dry canal bed where engineer parties were busily preparing the 
four dry crossings. “Men clambered up the eastern bank like so many 
hundreds of ants, while Engineers scurried around erecting scaffolds 
and runways to facilitate the crossing of guns and vehicles.”62 At 
7:30, parties of signal linesmen, following the advancing infantry, 
extended telephone cables over the canal at Lock 3, running them 
south of Sains-Lez-Marquin.63
The 4th Battalion, assembled northeast of Inchy-en-Artois, 
overcame the 10 to 12-foot-high western bank and crossed near “C” 
and “D”. They advanced 2,000 yards and reached the Red Line 
immediately behind the barrage, having spent six minutes mopping 
up the canal in their whirlwind attack. From Paviland Wood, north 
of Inchy-en-Artois, the 14th Battalion crossed the River Agache over 
planks. Farther north, they cut across two water-and-wire-filled 
ditches, at E.2.a. north of “D”, capturing several concealed machine 
gun posts near the canal bank. On a 300-yard frontage, they dropped 
into the canal bed at 5:45 a.m. between “D” and Lock 3. The 1st 
Brigade, CE had intended to supply ten light bridges to assist the 
infantry over ditches near “D” and fifteen scaling ladders to mount 
the canal banks. The ladders and bridges were never delivered.64 
Instead, the storm troops climbed on one another’s shoulders to 
mount the 8-foot-high west bank.65 The 13th Battalion, following 
the 14th, reached the Agache, which they waded through. Farther 
north they encountered a stream 5 feet deep. “This was to have been 
bridged previous to the attack, but time had not permitted, so, with 
62  William W. Murray, The History of the 2nd Canadian Battalion CEF in the Great 
War 1914-1919 (Ottawa: The Historical Committee 2nd Battalion CEF, 1947), 300.
63  Canadian Signal Service, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4805, File 162, LAC.
64  WD, 1st Canadian Infantry Brigade, September 1918, Appendix 17, LAC; 3rd 
Canadian Infantry Brigade, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4805, File 155, LAC. The lorry 
carrying the light bridges and ladders had gone astray and was never located during 
the night before Zero Hour.
65  Fetherstonhaugh, Royal Montreal Regiment, 250; Flanders’ Fields: Canadian 
Voices From WWI, Episode 15, The Last Push: Canal du Nord to Mons; WD, 3rd 
Infantry Brigade, September 1918, Appendix 15, LAC
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their kilts floating the men waded [armpit-deep] through…”66 The 
kilted 15th Battalion likewise had to cut across the Agache—some 
using planks—before reaching the canal. They splashed through 
ditches before crossing a footbridge opposite Sains-Lez-Marquion by 
10:00 a.m.67 
The 10th Canadian Infantry Brigade’s four battalions participated 
in the first phase, with the Marquion Line (Red Line) as the objective. 
Their jump-off area was in the E.7.b and E.7.d sectors, east of Inchy-
en-Artois.68 The 46th and 44th led the attack, with the 50th and 47th 
respectively leap-frogging the two leading battalions at the Sunken 
Road, just east of the Canal du Nord Line. “Each section [of the 46th 
Battalion] was given a rope. If there was water in there, somebody 
in the section had to get out and he had to pull the rest out…”69 At 
midnight before Zero Hour, 50th Battalion signallers reconnoitred 
the canal bank, carrying a heavy rope for stretching across the canal. 
They were surprised to find no water in it.70 
The 4th Brigade, CE had provided twenty-five scaling ladders 
each to the 44th and 46th Battalions for surmounting the elevated 
banks. Keeping the 44th’s leading waves clear from the barrage proved 
difficult owing to the rear units pressing forwards and everyone 
anxious to get as quickly as possible over the canal. Accordingly, their 
own gunfire cut down many men.71 The 47th companies slid down the 
sloping brick-faced western wall and scaled the eastern bank with the 
44th’s ladders. Some climbed broken masonry in the embankment.72
The 3rd Canadian and the 11th British Divisions crossed the canal 
in preparation for the second phase to be launched at 3 p.m. Due to 
the XVII British Corps’ failure to keep pace with the advance, the 
66  Robert C. Fetherstonhaugh, The 13th Battalion Royal Highlanders of Canada 
1914-1919 (Montreal: The 13th Royal Highlanders of Canada, 1925), 276.
67  Kim Beattie, 48th Highlanders of Canada 1891-1928 (48th Highlanders of Canada, 
1932), 372; WD, 15th Infantry Battalion, September 1918, Appendix 207, LAC.
68  4th Canadian Division Report, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4797, File 83, LAC.
69  McWilliams and Steel, Suicide Battalion, 174.
70  Victor Wheeler, The 50th Battalion in No Man’s Land (Calgary, Alberta Historical 
Resources Foundation, 1980), 345. On 29 September, life-belts were worn over tunics 
by Staffordshire brigade troops from the 46th British Division for crossing the 
35-foot-wide Canal de St. Quentin. Hauling lines, planks, rafts, and mud-mats were 
also provided. See R.E. Priestley, Breaking the Hindenburg Line: The Story of the 
46th (North Midland) Division (London: T. Fisher Unwin, 1919), 42.
71  WD, 44th Battalion, September 1918, Appendix B, LAC.
72  WD, 47th Battalion, September 1918, Report on Operations, LAC.
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3rd Canadian Division was not engaged that day. The 11th Division 
proceeded into action capturing Epinoy at 7:00 p.m.73
Chief Engineer Lindsay had “ordered his men to work under 
fire to construct these logistical arteries…”74 The Canadian engineers, 
following the infantry into the canal, placed four infantry footbridges 
across it between “E” and “G”. Reports vary claiming four, six or 
seven footbridges were thrown across the canal, but the Canadians 
only carried materiel for four.75 In fact, Canadian sappers erected four 
footbridges and British sappers erected three. The British sappers 
assembled them about a half mile north of Sains-Lez-Marquion. The 
11th Battalion, Manchester Regiment crossed over these footbridges 
about 11 a.m. The British infantry bridge at “H” was converted 
midday to a pontoon and trestle bridge, leaving six intact footbridges. 
Additionally, 56th British Divisional engineers assembled two 
footbridges 300 yards south of the Arras-Cambrai Road and two 
north of it.76
The 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and 4th Brigades, CE pooled their bridging 
equipment for the operations, commanded by a 1st PBTU, CE officer. 
All four PBTUs and the motor-driven 1st Pontoon Park, RE came 
under enemy shelling and machine gun fire while hauling materiel for 
light bridges and footbridges in twelve trestle wagons and twenty-one 
pontoon wagons to the crossing sites. In one area, a shell killed two 
horses pulling a pontoon wagon.77 In the 3rd PBTU, CE three men 
were wounded and one reported missing. A mule and a horse from 
this unit were killed and six horses wounded.78
The 3rd Battalion, CE constructed dry “D” and wet “E”, “F”, 
and “G” crossings. At “D” (northeast of Inchy-en-Artois near a 
fragmented 107-foot-span iron bridge at E.2.a) a 30-foot diameter 
73  Currie, Canadian Corps Operations, 59-60.
74  Tim Cook, Shock Troops: Canadians Fighting the Great War 1917-1918, Volume 
Two (Toronto: Viking Canada, 2008), 517.
75  Hodgins, Brief report on the crossings over CANAL DU NORD on Sept. 27th, 
1918, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4811, LAC; Narrative of Bridging Operations Over Canal 
du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29, File 4, LAC; WD, 1st Canadian 
PBTU, CE, Appendix II, September 1918, LAC.
76  WD, First Army, Report on First Army Operations 26th August – 11th November, 
1918, Part III, LAC; Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 
Volume V, 25.
77  Narrative in Connection with Canal du Nord–Bourlon Wood Operations, RG9, 
III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29, File 3, LAC. 
78  WD, 3rd Canadian PBTU, CE, September 1918, LAC.
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crater blocked a built-up road cut through the west bank. Work 
began at 7:00 a.m. and a temporary detour permitted the field 
artillery to cross at 8:40 a.m. The fifty sappers had two-way traffic 
operational after 5:30 p.m. Two enemy machine guns firing from the 
far bank at the approaches to the bridge delayed work until 1:00 
p.m. at “E” near Sains-lez-Marquion, adjacent to a destroyed bridge. 
The infantry had passed over in the first rush but failed to mop 
up concealed tunnels and dugouts. The creeping barrage’s timetable 
had prevented a thorough search. Forty-eight OR from B Company 
erected a 90-foot bridge, constructed with three pontoons (owing to 
10 feet of water at the canal’s centre) and two trestles, and finished 
it with canvas screening at 6:25 p.m. Enemy machine guns on the 
eastern bank held up construction until 12:00 p.m. at “F” northeast 
of Sains-Lez-Marquion and 100 feet south of the sheared iron bridge. 
As at “E”, ramps were cut through the banks. Two sapper sub-
sections completed the 60-foot-span pontoon and trestle bridge at 
1:30 p.m. Work on the light bridge at “G”, beside a demolished timber 
bridge, was delayed until 1:30 p.m., owing to heavy enemy machine 
gun fire from the swamp east of the canal, and finished about 4 p.m. 
Three Weldon trestles with a 60-foot span were constructed above 
the muddy bed. C Company with three officers and 134 OR had 
constructed “F” and “G” bridges. A heavy bridge for light tanks at 
“G” with footings and timber piers was started around 3 p.m. and 
completed the next day at 2 p.m. involving over ten hours’ working 
time. The 104-foot bridge included four 20-foot spans.79 
Major Bruce Ross, 3rd Battalion, CE supervised the construction 
of four footbridges and two light bridges near Sains-Lez-Marquion. 
One corporal and ten OR assembled each footbridge while under 
machine gun fire. Ross and his runners clashed with the fourteen-
member machine gun crew, capturing seven. While throwing the first 
footbridge across the canal at W.26.b.2.5, Corporal Alfred Pynn’s 
group came under heavy shelling and machine gun fire. He earned 
the Distinguished Conduct Medal (DCM). Sapper James Wyatt, 
covering the hostile machine gun with his rifle, dashed across the first 
completed footbridge, shot one of the remaining crew, and captured 
79  WD, 3rd Battalion, CE, September 1918, Narrative of Bourlon Wood Operations, 
LAC; Alexander Macphail, Construction of Canal Crossings By the 1st Brigade, CE, 
RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4809, File 195, LAC. 
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two others plus the machine gun. Wyatt earned the DCM.80 All 
four footbridges were completed between 9:15 and 10:00 a.m. when 
Canadian and British battalions crossed over.81
An unplanned small bridge was constructed across a stream 
north of Inchy-en-Artois. The 3rd Battalion, CE along with the 1st 
Battalion, CE constructed three crossings over the River Agache 
east of “E” and “F” where the water ran 8 feet deep. These bridges, 
completed around 1:30 p.m., were made with Weldon trestles with 
multiple 30-foot spans.82 The destroyed bridge on the Agache was 
repaired and re-decked for two-way traffic on the 28th. A 15-foot-
span bridge over the Agache was completed on the 28th and another 
on the 29th for traffic from “G”.
The 1st Battalion, CE tackled road and track maintenance, 
dugout reconnaissance, and Blue Line area consolidation. These 
combat engineers wore battle equipment and carried 120 rounds 
of ammunition. The 2nd Battalion, CE repaired roads and made a 
general reconnaissance for mines and booby traps. They were also 
responsible for the water supply and well water testing. Access to water 
in captured territory was important not only for drinking, washing, 
and cooking, but also for animal transport. Normally, horses needed 
watering three times a day.83 Three new pumping installations and 
sufficient troughs to water 5,000 horses an hour were completed by 
2:00 p.m. on the 27th.84 
At Zero Hour, three officers and sixty OR from 10th Battalion, 
CE assembled to construct two dry crossings. Sappers started work 
at 6:00 a.m. at “A” east of Moeuvres, located below a destroyed 
107-foot-span steel bridge at E.15.a. where six-foot-deep craters 
embedded with mines made each embankment impassable. The foot 
trail to the canal and the openings were improved. Spoil from the 
80  14906 Supplement to the London Gazette, 2 December 1919; James Ernest Wyatt, 
RG150, Accession 1992-93/166, Box 10616-42, LAC.
81  Appendix E, Narrative Canal du Nord–1st Brigade, CE, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 
4809, File 195, LAC.
82  WD, 3rd Battalion, CE, September 1918, LAC.
83  The costliest single week in Canadian animal lives occurred in the week ending 3 
October 1918 when 865 animals were killed, destroyed or evacuated. See Andrew S. 
McEwen, “Maintaining the Mobility of the Corps: Horses, Mules, and the Canadian 
Army Veterinary Corps in the Great War” (PhD Thesis: University of Calgary, 
2016), 416.
84   Interim Report on Crossings of Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, 
Folder 29, File 4, LAC.
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thirteen-foot-high banks was used to level the 50-foot-wide canal 
bed, 3 feet below ground level. The sappers completed the crossing for 
one-way horse traffic at 7:50 a.m., and at 9:00 a.m. for two-way horse 
traffic.85 Meanwhile, pioneers and engineers from the 63rd British 
Division erected two trestle bridges, one 500 yards south of “A” at 
E.15.c.2.6 and another at E.21.a.1.8. They were open to traffic by 
11:30 a.m. and 6:45 p.m. respectively.86
At “B” south of Lock 4, detonated mines had left a large crater in 
the existing roadway in the sunken canal bed’s centre and a smaller 
one in the west embankment. Sappers filled the canal bed with spoil to 
ground level. The 10th Battalion, CE completed “B” crossing for one-
way horse traffic at 6:50 a.m., two-way horse traffic at 7:20 a.m., and 
two-way lorry traffic at 8:20 a.m. Engineer parties were assigned to 
10th Infantry Brigade battalions to investigate booby traps. Sappers 
had also cut lanes through the wire in routes to the assembly areas 
and constructed bridges over trenches west of the canal.87 
Two officers and thirty-seven OR from the 11th Battalion, CE 
were shelled as the party headed towards “C”, near a collapsed 98-foot-
span iron bridge at E.8.b. Four were killed and two wounded. A mine 
had completely blown out the road fill at this crossing. Therefore, the 
engineers needed to build up fill 18 feet from the crater’s bottom to 
road level with two tanks packing in the old road material, timber 
and rock fill. The crossing was ready for field artillery at 8:00 a.m. 
By 1:45 p.m., lorry traffic was passing over the 60-foot planked 
roadway.88 Two-way traffic ran the next day. The 4th Brigade, CE 
assisted the infantry in constructing strong points and consolidating 
positions gained. 
The 11th British Division’s 67th Field Company, RE and East 
Yorks Pioneers were delayed working on the bridge at “H”, near the 
destroyed bridge at W.15.a, after the detachment lost its horses to 
machine gun fire; some killed, and others stampeded. The combined 
85  Report on Bridging the Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 29, 
File 4, LAC; Brief report on the crossings over Canal du Nord, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 
4811, LAC.
86  Report on the Operations of the 63rd (RN) Division from 27th September to 2nd 
October, 1918, Appendix B, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3856, Folder 78, File 10, LAC.
87  WD, 10th Battalion, CE, September 1918, page 126, LAC; 10th Infantry Brigade 
B.W. Operations – Preparations RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4805, File 155, LAC.
88  A. J. MacPherson, Report on Crossing Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 
3964, Folder 29, File 4, LAC.
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pontoon and trestle bridge for field guns and horse transport traffic 
was finished at 7:00 p.m.89 Work commenced after 1:00 p.m. on the 
two bridges at “K” near Marquion on the Arras-Cambrai Road 
beside the submerged 105-foot-span iron girder bridge at W.9.d.90 The 
sappers erected the medium pontoon bridge for first-line transport 
by 4:50 p.m. A 120-foot-long heavy pontoon Class ‘D’ bridge, to 
supplement the pontoon bridge, was ready at 7:30 p.m. to carry 3-ton 
lorry traffic and 6-inch howitzers. The 32nd and 34th British infantry 
brigades used these northern bridges. 
A heavy bridging train arrived at Sains-Lez-Marquion at 1:00 
p.m. carrying the materiel for two rectangular Inglis bridges. Work 
began at 2:00 p.m. under heavy shelling at “F” beside the sheared 
iron girder bridge. By 10:00 p.m., an officer and sixty-four OR 
from the 5th Army Troops Company, CE with assistance from C 
Company, 7th Battalion, CE had assembled a nine-bay 108-foot 
bridge, ready for traffic about 1:00 p.m. on the 28th after thirteen 
hours’ construction. The bridging materiel for “K” arrived late in the 
afternoon of the 27th. Work commenced the next morning at 8:30 
a.m. under heavy shelling. Four officers and seventy-eight OR from 
the 4th Army Troops Company, CE and five officers and 150 OR from 
the 4th Battalion, CE constructed the approaches and abutments, 
then assembled and launched the bridge. This heavy bridge opened 
for traffic before 10:00 p.m. after twelve-and-a-half hours’ work under 
shell fire.91 There were no casualties.
The 1st and 4th Canadian Divisions had captured most Blue 
Line objectives by 1:00 p.m. on the 27th and were firmly established 
that evening.92 Also by 1:00 p.m., all four dry crossings were carrying 
lorry and artillery traffic, footbridges were installed and the River 
Agache bridged allowing the guns to partake in the operation’s later 
stages. By 7:00 p.m. traffic flowed over bridges at “E”, “F”, “G”, “H”, 
89  Interim Report on Crossings of Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1. Volume 3964, Folder 
29, File 4, LAC; 11th Division Report on Operations, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4798, 
File 98, LAC.
90  Canal du Nord and Bridges, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3912, Folder 42, File 5, LAC.
91  Interim Report on Crossings of Canal du Nord, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3964, Folder 
29, File 4, LAC; WD, Chief Engineer, September 1918, Heavy Bridging Operations, 
Appendix B, LAC; WD, 4th Army Troops Company, CE, September 1918, LAC; 
WD, 5th Army Troops Company, CE, September 1918, LAC.
92  General Staff Report, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3923, Folder 12, File 5, LAC. Fontaine-
Notre-Dame eluded capture until the next morning by the 3rd Canadian Division.
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and “K”. To the sappers’ credit, six footbridges, four dry crossings, 
and nine bridges had been completed over the canal in forty hours. 
The 7th Tank Battalion allocated eight Mark IV tanks to 
each of the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Canadian Divisions for crushing wire 
barricades, suppressing machine gun nests, and mopping up pockets 
of resistance. The 4th Canadian Division’s tanks crossed in two waves, 
at Zero Hour and Zero plus twenty minutes. The four leading tanks 
rumbled over without incident. Owing to engine trouble, a tank in 
the second wave failed to make the crossing. Another struck an anti-
tank mine in “A” crossing’s western embankment and again in the 
eastern embankment, blocking the passage after its left tractor belt 
was destroyed. Another tank towed it away. Sappers used guncotton 
to detonate additional detected mines.93 The 1st Canadian Division’s 
eight tanks crossed the canal at E.2.c.9.8 (immediately below “D”) and 
E.2.d.1.0 (just north of “C”, east of Inchy-en-Artois). Three assigned 
to the 1st Brigade received direct hits. The four tanks assigned to the 
3rd Brigade reached the 13th Battalion who were facing intact barbed 
wire belts. One tank commander claimed he was short of petrol. All 
four tanks turned back abandoning the troops. Consequently, the 
13th battalion suffered heavy casualties.94 Seventeen tank personnel 
and five of the sixteen tanks became casualties that day.95 At 1:00 
a.m. on 28 September, six of the eight tanks (two in reserve) assigned 
to the 3rd Canadian Division’s 7th Brigade crossed at E.8.d.8.0, near 
“B” on their way to the Marcoing Line.
Unlike the infantry, engineers and tank crews, the artillery did 
not cross the canal at Zero Hour; it operated from the western side. 
Maj.-Gen. Edward Morrison, Canadian Corps Artillery commander, 
explained the barrage arrangement at Canal du Nord. “[I]n order to 
put on a proper barrage it was necessary to concentrate 20 brigades 
of field artillery and ten brigades of heavy artillery on a front of 
4,000 yards, and as close as possible to the jumping-off line in order 
93  In one sector, the sappers removed over 200 tank mines. See Currie, Canadian 
Corps Operations, 63.
94  WD, 3rd Brigade, September 1918, Appendix 15, Tanks, LAC; RG9, III-D-2, 
Volume 4804, File 154, LAC.
95  7th Tank Battalion, Lieut.-Col. Thorpe, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4807, File 173, 
LAC. 
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that the barrage should ‘fanout’....”96 In the first phase the 1st and 
4th Canadian Divisions were each allotted ten field artillery brigades 
and two heavy artillery brigades.97 On the 4th Canadian front, six 
field artillery brigades, positioned about 1,500 yards from the canal, 
would take part in the barrage to the Red Line. At Zero Hour and 
in darkness, the other four brigades limbered up and advanced to 
the canal’s western side where the barrage from eight brigades would 
extend to the Green Line. The creeping barrage could not be extended 
beyond the Green Line. Eight brigades positioned at the canal would 
advance the barrage to the Blue Line.98 On the 1st Canadian front, 
the artillery could cover the Blue Line from fixed positions instead 
of leap-frogging batteries to maintain a continuous barrage.99 The 
capture of Sains-Lez-Marquion involved an innovative “monkey 
puzzle barrage.” Instead of moving forwards, the barrage crept 
backwards from the far side of the village towards the 18-pounders 
and 4.5-inch howitzers of the 1st and 2nd Brigades, Canadian Field 
Artillery (CFA) which were firing at it.100 
Without a preliminary bombardment, the attack was launched 
with a shrapnel, high explosive, smoke, and machine gun fire barrage. 
The enemy’s coloured rocket display greeted the opening barrage and 
their artillery replied five minutes later resulting in heavy casualties 
in the forward-sited artillery positions. Lieutenant Ronald Sykes, 201 
Squadron, RAF was flying about 1,000 feet over the battlefield. “A 
shell burst below me—and within a second the whole of the ground 
seemed to be turning over, boiling up in brown earth that had been 
thrown up and smoke from the bursting shells.”101 Around 8:00 a.m. 
1st Canadian Divisional Artillery (CDA) batteries moved forwards 
over a congested road leading to “D”. The 6th Battery, 2nd Brigade, 
96  Edward Morrison, The War As Morrison Saw It: With the Conquering Canadians 
from Valcartier to the Rhine (Ottawa, c1928), LAC. Another two field artillery 
brigades from the 11th British Division totalled twenty-two.
97  Edmonds, Military Operations France and Belgium 1918 Volume V, 20. 
98  Artillery Notes On Operations of the Canadian Corps 27th September to October 
1st, 1918, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3912, Folder 42, File 10, LAC. Five Royal Field 
Artillery and five Canadian Field Artillery brigades provided the barrage.
99  Gerald W.L. Nicholson, The Gunners of Canada: The History of the Royal 
Regiment of Canadian Artillery, Volume I 1534-1919 (Toronto: McClelland and 
Stewart, 1967), 359.
100  WD, 2nd Brigade, CFA, September 1918, LAC; Artillery, Bourlon Wood, RG9, 
III-D-2, Volume 4807, File 176, LAC.
101  Peter Hart, The Last Battle: Victory, Defeat, and the End of World War I 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 109.
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CFA crossed first over the canal at “D”.102 All 1st and 2nd Brigade 
batteries were across by 10:30 a.m.103 1st Canadian Divisional Trench 
Mortar Group’s X Battery passed through “D” at 10:30 a.m. Batteries 
from the 6th Brigade, CFA moved over around noon.104 The 1st 
Canadian Motor Machine Gun Brigade traversed the dry crossings at 
2:45 p.m., followed by the 2nd and 5th CDA batteries between 3:00 
and 4:00 p.m. The 61st Battery, CFA cut across “A” between 3:00 and 
4:00 p.m. The 59th Brigade, 11th British Divisional Artillery, Royal 
Field Artillery crossed “D” sometime after 1:30 p.m. The 3rd Siege 
Battery (6-inch howitzers), 1st Brigade, Canadian Garrison Artillery 
(CGA), made a night crossing near the Arras-Cambrai Road during 
the early hours of 28 September over a pontoon bridge, likely one of 
the two “K” bridges, which the 7th Siege Battery, 1st Brigade, CGA 
had used the previous afternoon.105 
To feed the hungry guns, tramways rapidly transported myriad 
shells to the front. The Canadians had made extensive use of trench 
tramways in forward areas and light railways in rear areas. By 
January 1918, the Canadian-run tramways were five times more 
efficient in hauling materiel than other corps-run tramways.106 In July 
1918, Canadian-constructed light railways were permitted to exceed 
the normal army allotment. The Canadian Corps had permission to 
do almost anything it liked with light railways.107 The No. 1 and No. 
2 Tramways Companies, units in the Corps of Canadian Engineers, 
were established in the spring of 1916. They “were authorized, formed, 
worked, and finally were demobilized in France, and never existed as 
units in any other place than the forward area.”108 
Petrol-electric and petrol-driven tractors, like their light railway 
steam locomotive counterparts, operated on 60-centimetre gauge track. 
102  L.M. Firth, 6th Battery, 2nd Brigade C.F.A. (Bonn, 1919), 17, LAC.
103  27th September, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4807, File 176, LAC.
104  John MacDonald (ed.), Gun-Fire: An Historical Narrative of the 4th Brigade 
C.F.A. in the Great War (1914-1918) (Toronto: The Greenway Press, 1929; reprint 
Naval & Military Press, 2004), 192.
105  WD, 3rd Canadian Siege Battery, September 1918, LAC.
106  W.J.K. Davies, Light Railways of the First World War (Newton-Abbot: David & 
Charles, 1967), 56.  
107  Alan M. Henniker, Transportation on the Western Front 1914-1918 (Uckfield, 
England: The Naval & Military Press, 2009), 327, 453; Davies, Light Railways of the 
First World War, 101.
108  Francis E. Collinson, “The Canadian Engineers’ First Tramways Company’s 
Work in France,” Canadian Railway and Marine World November, (1919): 575-78. 
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Army railway troops operating coal-burning steam-powered trains 
shuttled troops, ammunition, food, water, and other commodities 
between standard-gauge railheads and intermediate dumping points. 
The closest place where locomotives could safely deliver in daylight 
without their steam, smoke, and sparks clearly giving away their 
position was the end of the line.109 The 1 to 10-ton wagons were 
uncoupled and the corps tramways troops took over at the transfer 
sidings. Closer to the front, the trench tramways merged with push 
trollies on trench tracks. The British, unlike the Canadians, classified 
all mechanically powered steam and petrol-electric narrow-gauge trains 
as light railways.110 In 1918, the tramways companies constructed 192 
miles of light railway and hauled 484,222 tons of materiel.111
“The Light Railways will be pushed forward over the Canal 
with all possible speed in order that Artillery Ammunition may be 
delivered East of the CANAL by Light Railway and thus reduce 
the amount of wheeled traffic over the bridges.”112 Operation Order 
No. 18 placed the 2nd Tramways Company, CE in charge of the 
60-centimetre gauge track in the Canadian area. The 6th Battalion, 
CE worked on the tracks over the dry canal bed at E.8.a.9.9 near 
Inchy-en-Artois easterly through E5 central and also at junction 
W.26.b.1.9, north of Sains-lez-Marquion, north-easterly through 
W.22 central. This tramways crossing, over water 6 feet deep built 
at W.26.b.3.9, immediately north of “F”, was completed on 29 
September. The 8th Battalion, CE worked on light railways in liaison 
with the 2nd Tramways Company, CE. The 6th and 8th Battalions, 
CE completed the tramways bridge at E.8.a.9.9, north of “C”.113 Rail-
delivered ammunition arrived well past the canal on Zero plus two 
109  Davies, Light Railways, 153.
110  Love, A Nation In Making Volume 2, 276; Andrew Iarocci, “Sinews At War: 
Transportation and Supply,” in Capturing Hill 70: Canada’s Forgotten Battle of the 
First World War, (eds.) D. Delaney and S. Durflinger (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2016), 
148; David Guay, Tracks to the Trenches: Canadian Railway Troops in the Great 
War (1914-1919) (Markham, ON: Fifth House, 2017), 54, 61, 72, 81; Tramways 
Company, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4446, Folder 2, File 10, LAC.
111  Canadian Corps Tramways, RG9, III-D-2, Volume 4808, File 186, LAC.
112  Bourlon Wood Engineer Instructions No. 5, RG9, III-C-5, Volume 4426, Folder 
3, File 9, LAC.
113  Karl Weatherbe, From the Rideau to the Rhine and Back: The 6th Field Company 
and Battalion Canadian Engineers (Toronto: Hunter-Rose, 1928), 398; WD, 8th 
Battalion, CE, September 1918, LAC.
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days, and to Bourlon village on Zero plus four days. About 3 miles of 
tramways had been constructed. 
conclusion
The Battle of Canal du Nord although a brilliant tactical success 
was costly. The five-day operation resulted in 13,672 casualties in 
the 1st, 3rd, and 4th Canadian Divisions—3,070 more than at Vimy 
Ridge, 9-14 April 1917. However, infantry reinforcements from 26 
September to 1 October only numbered 2,350.114 The 20 percent loss 
(7 percent more than at Amiens) matched that of Passchendaele. 
Casualties from the four divisions and corps troops who fought 
at Canal du Nord and at Cambrai, 26 September to 10 October, 
totalled 14,849. The engineers sustained 720 casualties in September 
1918.115 Engineer (including signal units) fatalities in the Great 
War totalled 2,004 of the 7,180 casualties.116 Only the infantry and 
artillery suffered more losses under enemy fire than the engineers.
The versatility and courage of the engineer formations—taking 
on the role of combat troops when required—is reflected in the 1,582 
decorations awarded to them, including 1 VC, 42 DSOs, 205 MCs, 
69 DCMs, and 610 MMs.117 In a letter to Prime Minister Sir Robert 
Borden, Currie wrote: “Let me tell you that those bridges were 
begun not only under shell fire, but under machine gun fire, and yet 
nothing could deter the work of our men.”118 Horne too, conveyed his 
appreciation of the engineers’ work, acknowledging their steadiness 
and dependability under enemy fire.119  
114  MG30, E5, Volume 3, Battle of BW Reinforcements, LAC.
115  Strengths & Casualties in Various Battles, RG24-C-6-e, Volume 1844, File GAQ 
11-11B, LAC; Return of Killed, Wounded and Missing (By Months), RG24-C-6-e, 
Volume 1844, File GAQ 11-5, LAC.
116  The Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers: A Brief History (Ottawa: Department 
of National Defence, 1948), 36; Casualties by Enemy Fire, RG24-C-6-e, Volume 1844, 
File GAQ 11-10, LAC.
117  The Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers, 50; Kerry and McDill, The History of 
the Corps of Royal Canadian Engineers, Volume 1, 333. 
118  Bill Rawling, Surviving Trench Warfare: Technology and the Canadian Corps, 
1914-1918 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1992), 210.
119  W.H. Anderson, First Army, 3 October 1918, RG9, III-C-1, Volume 3856, Folder 
76, File 2, LAC.
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The Battle of Canal du Nord certainly can be viewed as an 
engineers’ battle based on the fundamental importance of road 
repair and bridge building. No less critical were the construction 
of tramways and dry-weather tracks and the delivery of water to 
roadside storage tanks in the conquered territory. Essentially, the 
engineers contributed to the “all-arms battle” tactics in the Hundred 
Days when the infantry, artillery, tanks, and aircraft maintained 
excellent coordination accompanied by the “meticulous planning and 
execution on behalf of the Corps’ logistical services and the engineers 
in particular.”120 Currie, in a special order issued 3 October 1918, 
wrote: “The initiative and resourcefulness displayed by the Engineers 
contributed materially to the depth and rapidity of our advances.”121 
The Canadian engineers had performed ubiquitous and indispensable 
battlefield work. These adept engineers played a pivotal role in open 
warfare—their crucial performance a vital factor in the Canadian 
victories in the last one hundred days of the war.
◆     ◆     ◆     ◆
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appendix a:  map grid reference numbers.122
The letter grid square is A to X. 
Each lettered grid square 
is divided into smaller 
numbered squares: 1-30 (on 
some maps 1-36).
The numbered square is further 
divided into four lettered squares 
(quadrants): a, b, c, and d. 
Lastly, this lettered square (500 
yards by 500 yards) is divided 
into tenths giving a position to 
the nearest 50 yards.
For example, the bridge at “F” crossing was located at W.26.b.3.8 
and the dry “D” crossing was located at E.2.c.8.9 south of “F” 
crossing. W.21.a.55.30 denotes 5-yard accuracy.
122  See https://library.mcmaster.ca/how-read-wwi-map-reference-number (accessed 
5 February 2019)
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